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Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract:       
The paper aims to contribute to the understanding of why there is a lack of domestic 
saving  and  investment  in  rural  parts  of  sub-Saharan  Africa.  It  focuses  on 
heterogeneity  in  inter-temporal  preferences  as  a  possible  explanation  of  this 
important puzzle. The study is based on a unique experimental data set collected 
from 856 respondents in Ugandan villages and scrutinizes how individual patience – 
measured by the discount rate – is formed. 
The  results  suggest  that  Ugandan  respondents  are  substantially  less  patient  than 
their counterparts in similar experimental studies undertaken in developed countries 
and South Asia. We find a strong negative association between the level of education 
and the individual discount rate. Furthermore, we took advantage of the Ugandan 
education reform in 1996 and varying school frequency to demonstrate the causal 
relationship  stemming from  education to  patience. The estimates suggest  that an 
additional year at school decreases the discount rate on average by 35 percentage 
points  after  controlling  for  other  characteristics  (age,  income  group,  sex,  marital 
status and clan linkage).  
Our findings strongly accord with patience understood as a non-cognitive ability 
which needs to be taught by parents, learnt at school and promoted by social norms. 
The  Ugandan  responses,  therefore,  propose  a  new  way  in  which  education  may 
influence development in sub-Saharan Africa – by shaping individual patience.       
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1  Introduction and Hypotheses 
 
There is hardly any bigger puzzle for development economists and policy-makers than the 
question  of  why  there  is  not  more  indigenous  saving  and  investment  in  poor  countries. 
Especially in the context of the persistent poverty in mostly agricultural sub-Saharan Africa, it 
is striking how local people do often not respond to the high rates of return on productive 
investments in agriculture. These instances are well documented. McKenzie and Woodruff 
(2003) estimated African rates of  return  to be 15%  per month for amounts  of USD 200. 
Goldstein and Udry (1999)  estimated the rate  of return to the  production of pineapple in 
Ghana. The rate of return associated with switching from traditional maize and cassava to 
pineapple are estimated to be in excess of 1,200%. However, very few people have decided to 
grow pineapple even though doing so requires only a moderate initial investment which could 
easily be covered by a loan collateralized by the land owned by these farmers. Similarly, 
Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2003) find that less than 15% of maize farmers in the area 
where they conducted field trials on the profitability of fertilizer report that they have used 
fertilizer in the previous season, despite an estimated rate of return in excess of 150%. The 
limited  responsiveness to  high  marginal  product  in  poor  countries is  usually attributed to 
credit  constraints,  government  failures  and  insurance  market  failures  (for  a  survey  see 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2004). Recently, growing attention has been paid to behavioral issues 
and  psychological  factors  that  limit  saving  and  investment  decisions  not  by  affecting  the 
constraints, but by changing the decision-making process itself.
1 
Back in 1914, Böhm-Bawerk (in Becker and Mulligan, 1997: 731) highlighted the importance 
of differences across individuals in the degree of patience: “The intensity of the preference for 
present gratifications varies greatly from person to person, as is attested by that famous scale 
which ranges from the American Indian who will sell the ancestral hunting grounds for a 
dram of ‘firewater’ to the sober, provident and educated scion of Europe’s cultured peoples.” 
Our research is, among other reasons, inspired and motivated by a simple but telling story 
which  happened  in  the  area  where  we  organized  the  survey  and  which  has  a  number  of 
common features with Böhm-Bawerk’s observation.
2 In 2004, a large proportion of Ugandan 
farmers were growing vanilla and as there was a boom in the international vanilla market 
farmers had a substantially higher income (approx. USh 200,000, or USD 110, per month) 
than  they  expected  and  were  used  to  earning.  However,  virtually  no  one  made  any 
precautionary savings or invested some proportion in better tools or fertilizers. The additional 
                                                            
1 For interesting articles which try to identify this research agenda, see Ray (2003), Duflo (2003) or Mullainathan 
(2005). 
2 These observations stem from the half-year which the authors spent teaching and researching in Ugandan 
villages.   2 
money was immediately spent on nice t-shirts, alcohol and coke, and men paid bride-prices 
for new wives. After several lucrative months the price of vanilla decreased rapidly and the 
same people were left with no money for health care for family members or school fees for 
their children.
3  
The aim of this paper is to study the determination of an individual’s patience, as we think a 
different perception of time has the capacity to explain a number of observable phenomena in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Within the traditional focus on constraints, the high time preference and 
lack of saving in sub-Saharan Africa is usually attributed to lack of discretionary income 
above the subsistence level and it is argued that individuals do not have enough money to 
save  (see,  for  example,  Sachs,  2004,  or,  for  a  survey,  Azariadis  and  Stachurski,  2004). 
Similarly,  Chakraborty  (2004),  Chakraborty  and  Das  (2005),  and  Haaparta  and  Puhakka 
(2004) argue that a lack of income prevents people from investing in health and that their 
consequently low life expectancy distorts saving. However, these theoretical advances have 
not been followed by micro-level evidence. In contrast to the substantial body of experimental 
literature on the subjective discount rate in developed countries (for a comprehensive survey 
see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002) we have not found any field experiment 
from rural parts of sub-Saharan Africa linking patience with individual characteristics.  
In this paper, we summarize the results of a field survey conducted in Ugandan villages which 
focuses on the subjective discount rate. To understand the determinants of patience, we also 
collect a variety of background data (age, sex, education, profession-income, clan linkage and 
marital status). The empirical results suggest that the roots of the high time preference may go 
further than just a lack of income. Non-cognitive skills linked to education and social norms 
seem to play an important role. In the experiment Ugandan respondents were asked to choose 
between an additional unexpected amount of Ugandan shillings equivalent to $110 right now 
and higher amounts one year later. Even though the respondents were clearly not constrained 
by  subsistence,  the  subjective  discount  rate  still  turned  out  to  be  extremely  high  (385% 
annually).  Interestingly,  a  substantial  part  of  the  variation  can  be  explained  by  level  of 
education,  age  and  clan-related  social  norms  after  controlling  for  other  variables.  Our 
estimates show that an additional year of education lowers the discount rate by 35 percentage 
points.  
In the seminal economics article on the subject, Strotz (1956: 177) expressed the view that 
people  are  born  with  certain  discount  functions,  but  the  true  discount  function  becomes 
sublimated by parental teaching and social pressure. Many psychological studies demonstrate 
that humans are born impatient (Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez, 1989). Learning to be future-
oriented and to choose actions whose reward is postponed in time is an essential part of our 
upbringing and educational process. Without such learning people would live solely in the 
present  without  much  will  to  resist  current  temptations  and  would  simply  omit  future 
pleasures  from their  decision-making  process  (Deopke and  Zillibotti,  2005;  Shonkoff  and 
Phillips,  2000).  Additionally,  Becker  and  Mulligan  (1997)  argue  that  education  can  be 
understood as an investment in patience. Education can help in forming a mental picture of 
one’s future pleasures and  difficulties in life and enhances the process of anticipation.  In 
addition, through repeated practice at problem-solving education helps one to learn the art of 
                                                            
3 A similar attitude to the future can be found in the main Ugandan English lecture book English in Use II for 
secondary schools in an exercise for practicing the conditional clause. Mbogo and Ndege are employees of 
Bwana Matata (English in Use: 95): “Mbogo: If Bwana Matata paid me my wage three months in advance, I 
could have another wife. Ndege: But if you spent all your money for a new wife, you would not have any money 
for living. Mbogo: If I didn’t have any money, my wife would go and work on a field. Ndege: If she knew it, she 
would not marry you. Mbogo: If she really loved me, she would surely marry me. Ndege: Anyway, I don’t think 
old Matata would agree. If he gave the money to you, all the others would like to have it as well.”   3 
scenario  simulation.  Thus,  education  may  be  understood  as  a  tool  which  helps  people  to 
reduce the remoteness of future pleasures. To summarize these advances we can, again, rely 
on the writing of Böhm-Bawerk: “The present always gets its rights. It forces itself upon us 
through our senses. To cry for food when hungry occurs even to a baby. But future we must 
anticipate and picture…We must be able to form a mental picture of what will be the state of 
our wants, needs, feelings, at any particular point of time.” 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the survey 
design, sample and major variables. In Section 3, we show the relationship of the discount 
rate to individual characteristics and demonstrate the causal effect of education on patience. 
Section 4 concludes.  
2  Survey Design, Sample and Major Variables 
 
This study is based on data from a questionnaire survey that was conducted in ten villages in 
rural areas of the Mukono district (in the southern part of Uganda) under the auspices of the 
Institute  of  Economic  Studies,  Charles  University  in  Prague  and  the  Uganda  Czech 
Development Trust (UCDT) – a Czech NGO associated with Caritas. People usually grow 
maize,  vegetables,  green  bananas,  cassava,  vanilla  and  coffee.  The  vast  majority  of 
households are very poor by any standards, with the average per capita income less than 
USD 300  a  year  and  life  expectancy  at  birth  46  years,  largely  because  of  malaria  and 
HIV/AIDS. As 85% of Ugandan inhabitants live in rural areas with similar characteristics 
(WDI, 2005) and our respondents are not considerably better or worse off than other rural 
Ugandans, this area can be considered representative of much of Uganda. The questionnaires 
were distributed in the following ten villages: Kikube, Busagazi, Kateete, Buikwe, Nakifuma, 
Bweyogerere, Kasolo, Kygaya, Lugasa and Kirugu. 
A total of 910 respondents participated in the study and all questionnaires were completed 
during  the  first  two  weeks  of  November  2005.  The  respondents  were  assured  that  their 
responses would be anonymous. In all, 54 questionnaires were not filled out completely – 28 
respondents did not answer the question on the discount rate, and another 26 answered the 
question  on  the  discount  rate  but  did  not  give  information  on  one  of  the  individual 
characteristics (usually age, as not knowing one’s precise date of birth is quite common in the 
area).  The  incomplete  questionnaires  were  put  aside  and  not  included  in  the  statistical 
analysis. Our sample size is thus 856 respondents. 
Admittedly, completely random selection of respondents in the Ugandan rural population is 
an  impossible  task,  as  there  are  no  lists  of  residents  available  for  rural  areas.  The 
questionnaires were distributed by 30 UCDT social workers who live in the particular villages 
and who have a very deep knowledge of local people. Three social workers were responsible 
for distributing questionnaires in each village and they were instructed to approach a sample 
of respondents who are as representative of the village as possible.  
Most of the respondents are farmers; others are mostly students, housewives, drivers, teachers 
or shopkeepers. The resulting structure of our sample in terms of age, education, marital status 
and  other  individual  characteristics  is  illustrated  in  Table  2.  The  average  educational 
attainment in our sample is higher than for Uganda as a whole, where the secondary school 
enrollment rate is 23% (WB, 2006), whereas  one half of our respondents experienced at least 
one year at secondary school. The questionnaires were bilingual – in English and Luganda –   4 
to allow us to approach less educated people who speak only Luganda
4; however, illiterate 
Ugandans could not participate. The Ugandan illiteracy rate among people aged over 15 years 
is 31% (WDI, 2005). Illiteracy partly explains why our respondents are more educated and 
slightly  younger  than  the  Ugandan  average.  The  selected  sample  is  to  a  large  extent 
representative of the literate rural population in Uganda. 
The survey focused not only on time preference, but also on desired fertility, which is not 
analyzed in this paper. The questionnaire had 7 pages, but the length was doubled by the 
inclusion of the Luganda translation. The respondents were not time-constrained when filling 
out the questionnaires. Most of them did not have previous experience with filling out such 
questionnaires  (besides voting  sheets)  and they approached  the  task  very  responsibly.  On 
average they spent one and a half hours answering the questions.  
 
Table 1: Respondents and schools by villages  
Kikube Busagazi Kateete Buikwe Nakifuma Bweyogerere Kasolo Kygaya Lugasa Kirugu
Frequency
N 103 41 130 147 45 95 81 49 117 48
Proportion in sample 12% 5% 15% 17% 5% 11% 9% 6% 14% 6%
Education accessibility
Number of primary schools 12 3 9 10 12 16 12 8 12 7
Number of secondary schools 2 2 4 3 3 8 6 4 5 4
 
 




Man  Woman 15-18 19-23 24-28 29-34 35-70
Frequency
N 856 465 391 271 181 146 99 159
Fraction in sample 100% 54% 46% 32% 21% 17% 12% 19%
Education
Fraction who completed P4 93% 94% 92% 97% 97% 95% 92% 83%
Fraction who completed P7 70% 74% 66% 80% 78% 71% 67% 46%
Fraction who completed S2 49% 51% 47% 36% 69% 64% 55% 31%
Fraction who completed S6 7% 9% 6% 0% 3% 18% 24% 4%
Age (mean) 26 26 25 16 21 26 31 44
Family 
Single 487 274 213 259 144 60 10 14
Married or divorced 369 191 178 12 37 86 89 145
Respondents with strong clan linkage 161 117 44 46 30 22 13 50
Income
Lowest income group 246 110 136 19 34 46 40 107
Middle income group 485 277 208 249 126 54 25 31
Highest income group 125 78 47 3 21 46 34 21
Sex Age group
 
For eliciting the individual discount rate we will use question which is increasingly being 
used in the studies where also less educated respondents participate (Coller and Williams, 
1999 and Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002) in contrast to earlier studies conducted only 
among graduate students in laboratory conditions (Thaler, 1981 or Benzion a Yagil, 1989).   
                                                            
4 The official language in Uganda is English. The different local languages reflect the tribal divisions within 
Uganda. Luganda is the language of the Baganda people – the largest tribe in Uganda.   5 
 
In  similar  experimental  studies  in  developed  countries  the  subjective  discount  rate  was 
typically (e.g. Thaler, 1981 or Benzion and Yagil, 1989) inferred from a future amount which 
a  respondent  states  as  being  equally  desirable  as  a  different    amount  right  now.  We 
increasingly popular question used by Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison, Lau and 
Williams  (2002).  It  is  extremely  simple:  Do  you  prefer  USh 200,000  (USD  110)  now  or 
USh 200,000 + X one year later, where X is some positive amount? We posed five such 
questions, each question increasing X by some amount. As we increase X we expect more 
individuals to select the future option. The point at which a given respondent switches from 
the current amount to the future amount provides a range for his/her discount rate. The exact 
wording of this question is given in the Appendix.  
The advantages and disadvantages of this type of experimental study noted in the literature 
(for details, see, for example, Benzion and Yagil, 2001) apply to this study as well. The first 
issue relates to proper understanding of the questions, as the majority of local people do not 
have any experience with such exercises. In order to limit systematic misunderstanding there 
were three rounds of pre-testing with 10 respondents, and the questionnaires were adjusted 
based  on  follow-up  discussions.  In  addition,  30  local  employees  of  the  Uganda  Czech 
Development Trust were trained and worked as instructors when individually distributing the 
questionnaires to the respondents.  
Secondly, in experiments with hypothetical rewards there is a concern that respondents will 
have little incentive to work hard or thoughtfully on their responses and hence the responses 
may not reflect their actual economic decisions (Harrison et al., 2005). However, Chabris, 
Laibson and Schuldt (2006) reviewed recent experiments that study both real choices and 
hypothetical choices among the same respondents and show that systematic differences in the 
discount  rate  in  response  to  real  and  hypothetical  choices  are  typically  not  found.  Also, 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999: 8), who reviewed the issue of financial incentives on 74 earlier 
experiments  with  differing  levels  of  financial  incentives,  conclude:  “the  overwhelming 
finding is that increased incentives do not change average behavior substantively (although 
the variance of responses often decreases).” 
In traditional communities the person or organization that organizes the experiment is a very 
important parameter in terms of how local people approach the assigned tasks. The high social 
status of, and respect for, the instructors (social workers) within the village community also 
helped to  mitigate the possible problem  of missing  monetary incentives and we therefore 
believe that the respondents were positively motivated and completed the questionnaire with 
the necessary care and diligence. 
Thirdly, another issue relates to binary choices, as the range between the lowest (0%) and 
highest discount rate (650%) may not be sufficient to cover the preferences of some of the 
respondents. Although we increased the range upwards after pre-testing, the upper bound was 
still not high enough for 437 respondents, who chose the current option even in the last pair 
where  the  future  option  was  highest.  In  the  statistical  analysis  we  employed  650%  as  a 
censoring value for these responses. As consequence the estimates of the discount rate may be 
biased downwards. 
Fourthly, high inflation – or experience of it – might drive the absolute values of the discount 
rates, as the rewards were in local currency. However, Uganda is quite a low-inflation country 
and its inflation levels do not differ significantly from those in developed economies
5, hence 
any such effect should be rather moderate. 
                                                            
5 The average inflation rate for the period 2000–2004 was 4.3 percent (WDI, 2005).   6 
The questionnaire inquired about the following characteristics: education, age, sex, marital 
status, clan linkage and income. For details on the descriptive statistics of the sample see 
Table 2. Five values are assigned to five different age groups: the first cohort is of age 15–18, 
the second cohort is 19–23, the third cohort is 24–28, the fourth is 29–34 and the oldest cohort 
is 35 years and over. Sex is a standard dummy variable where women are equal to 1. Marital 
status is also a dummy that distinguishes single respondents from those married, divorced and 
widows. 
The  level  of  education  was measured  by  the  number  of  school  classes  completed  by  the 
respondent. At some points in the text we also refer to lower primary school (P1–P4), higher 
primary school (P5–P7), lower secondary school (S1–S2), higher secondary school (S3–S6) 
and above secondary school education level (diploma, bachelor or other university education).  
The  respondents also  indicated  their  village  of  residence.  This  information  allowed  us to 
assign each respondent a level of geographical proximity to education facilities as measured 
by the number of primary and secondary schools in the given village area (see Table 1).  
Strength of clan is a dummy variable that attempts to reflect the individual’s embeddedness 
within family structures. A clan is a subunit of a tribe and consists of families that believe 
they  have  the  same  ancestor.  The  respondents  were  asked  whether  their  decision-making 
process was largely influenced by their clan links or not. Although we are aware that the clan 
dummy is far from being a perfect approximation of the strength of traditional social norms 
perceived by an individual, it may at least partially reflect its effects on patience. 
Measuring  income  with  a  question  on  monetary  units  is  usually  avoided  in  an  economic 
environment  based  on  subsistence  farming  and  non-monetary  character  of  the  income. 
Therefore, we asked about profession and divided the respondents into three  groups. The 
lowest-income group comprises farmers and housewives. The middle-income group consists 
of  shopkeepers
6,  students  and  other-than-stipulated  professions.  The  high-income  group 
accommodates teachers, drivers and employees of NGOs or public bodies. The income group 
variable has three values: lowest = 1, middle = 2, and highest = 3. 
 
3  The Discount Rate and its Determinants 
 
Average Discount Rate 
Experimental studies on discount rates suggest that the rate is not constant and may differ due 
to the effect of delay, size and sign of the amount in question (Frederick et al., 2002). Even 
though comparing the absolute values from developed countries and Ugandan villages is a 
tricky and rather vague exercise, we still believe a rough and rather illustrative comparison is 
useful after taking into account the above-mentioned effects. 
As shown originally by Thaler (1981) the discount rate seems to be inversely related to the 
size of the amount in question. The smaller the amount (e.g. USD 5 compared to USD 50) the 
higher the discount rate. Thaler also found that losses and gains are perceived differently in 
his research on “reference based preferences.” Thaler’s study demonstrated that discount rates 
for losses are lower than discount rates for gains, over similar time periods and with similar 
amounts in question. Thirdly, discount rates seem to be higher for short delays – e.g. three 
days – than for long delays – e.g. one year.  
                                                            
6 Village shops are usually small shelters or huts where agricultural products and some small number of basic 
commodities are sold.   7 
If we control for the delay effect in the review of Frederick et al. (2002) and pick the studies 
which measure the one-year discount rate as in our study, we find an average of 39% for 
developed  countries.  Experimental  studies  from  developing  countries  are  still  very  rare. 
Pender (1996) measured discount rates in Indian villages and found a median discount rate of 
less than 50%. Anderson et al. (2004) empirically tested the discount rates in Vietnam and 
found no significant differences in patterns of discount rates between individuals in Vietnam 
as a representative of a poorer country and empirical evidence from other research conducted 
in more affluent countries. Interestingly, in the concluding section they point out: “What does 
seem plausible, however, is that they have less formal financial management experience and 
education  and  fewer  opportunities  or  options  to  develop  control  mechanisms  to  manage 
present consumption biases. Unfortunately, we did not collect data on education….”  
The average discount rate across our sample is 385%. The respondents were deciding about a 
relatively high amount (USh 100,000, which at the time of the research was 1.5 times the 
average monthly income) which they were supposed to gain and about an alternative amount 
with a one-year delay. We decided to employ five binary choices (six possible outcomes) to 
ensure  that  they  were  understood.  However,  this  decision  eliminated  the  possibility  of 
quantifying the above-mentioned effects of size, sign and delay, because, as we found from 
pre-testing, a questionnaire involving more types of binary choices would be too demanding 
for the respondents. Therefore, there may be some downward effect stemming from the size 
of the amount and the censoring of the highest discount rates, and an upward effect stemming 
from different perceptions of gains vs. losses. 
Even though we acknowledge how precarious the comparison across different studies is, we 
feel  safe  in  claiming  that  based  on  the  evidence  collected  the  discount  rate  in  Ugandan 
villages is substantially higher than in developed countries or in South Asia. The discount rate 
turned out to be roughly ten times higher. In any case, none of the caveats expressed above 
should  be  systemic  across  the  demographics  in  the  Ugandan  study.  Hence  we  hope  they 
should  not  substantially  affect  the  significance  of  the  possible  relations  between  socio-




We share the view of Anderson et al. (2004: 880) that we know surprisingly little about how 
discount rates are formed. Although the discount rate is perhaps biologically determined to 
some degree, it is reasonable to regard it as not immutable. As mentioned above we collected 
data  on  a  variety  of  respondent  characteristics  and  we  will  now  explore  how  these 
characteristics are associated with the discount rate. 
In our analysis we will mostly rely on comparison of means and results of regressions based 
on the following specification: 
  
ε β β β β β β + + + + + + + = INC CLAN FAM SEX AGE EDU C DR 5 4 3 2 1 0    (1) 
where DR = discount rate, C = constant, EDU = years of education, AGE = age cohort, SEX 
is clear, FAM = family status, CLAN = clan linkage, INC = income group and ε is the error 
term. The resulting betas measure how the given variable is associated with the discount rate. 
The statistical results are summarized in Table 3, and Table 4 presents the regression results. 
Besides running simple OLS we tried to address three major possible drawbacks of our data. 
Firstly, to deal with the fixed effects of the specific villages where the data were collected we 
included  clustering  in  the  OLS  regression.  The  resulting  standard  errors  and  significance 
levels were not substantially different from those of OLS without clustering. Secondly, we   8 
employed multinomial ordered PROBIT, as the inferred discount rate is  not a continuous 
variable (it consists of six values) as a consequence of the binary-choice type of question. 
TOBIT deals with the truncation of the data, as binary choices create a left-censoring limit 
(discount rate = 0.0) and a right-censoring limit (discount rate = 6.5). 
 





Education lower PS 4.61 (0.35) 3.93 5.29
higher PS 4.51 (0.19) 1.14 4.87
lower SS 3.91 (0.22) 3.49 4.33
higher SS 3.45 (0.15) 3.14 3.75
above SS 3.22 (0.35) 2.53 3.91
Age cohort 15-18 3.32 (0.18) 2.98 3.67
19-23 3.82 (0.21) 3.40 4.24
24-28 4.08 (0.22) 3.64 4.52
29-34 3.92 (0.29) 3.35 4.48
35-70 4.54 (0.22) 4.12 4.96
Sex Men 3.79 (0.13) 3.53 4.05
Women 3.93 (0.14) 3.65 4.21
Clan Strong linkage 3.72 (0.11) 3.50 3.93
Weak linkage 4.43 (0.21) 4.03 4.84
Income group Lowest income  4.32 (0.18) 3.97 4.66
Middle income  3.61 (0.13) 3.35 3.86






Table 4: OLS, PROBIT and TOBIT results for discount rate 
Intercept 4.00***(0.45) 4.00***(0.65) 6.18***(1.28)
Education (years) -0.16***(0.04) -0.16***(0.04) -0.06***(0.02) -0.44***(0.12)
Age cohort 0.28***(0.09) 0.28 ** (0.10) 0.12***(0.04) 0.90***(0.27)
Sex (woman=1) 0.19 (0.20) 0.19 (0.19) 0.05 (0.08) 0.42 (0.57)
Family status (married/div.=1) -0.05 (0.28) -0.05 (0.23) 0.00 (0.12) -0.23 (0.82)
Clan linkage (strong=1) 0.47 * (0.26) 0.47 (0.28) 0.19 * (0.11) 1.15 (0.74)
Income group 0.26 (0.19) 0.26 (0.21) 0.10 (0.08) 0.72 (0.53)
Prob > F, chi2
Observations







Note:   Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
  *** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
  ** Indicates significance at the 5% level. 
  * Indicates significance at the 10% level.   
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Education 
The first interesting outcome is a robust negative association between the level of education 
and the discount rate. Respondents with higher primary school education have a discount rate 
100  percentage  points  higher  than  respondents  with  higher  secondary  school  education. 
According to the OLS estimates there is on average a decrease of 16% for each additional 
year  at  school  after  we  control  for  other  variables  (age,  sex,  family,  clan  and  income). 
Education remains a significant variable at the 1% level for all types of regressions.  
Although the Ugandan empirical results strongly comply with the view that educated people 
are better equipped to resist the temptation of current gratification (see Shefrin and Thaler, 
1992), the data still do not provide an answer to the equally important question regarding 
mutual causality. Does education affect inter-temporal choices, or is an individual’s patience 
affected by some omitted variable (e.g. inborn characteristics) and, due to the lower discount 
rate, the individual goes to school more? 
A standard solution to the problem of causal inference is the instrumental variables method, 
where  the  existence  of  an  observable  covariate  that  affects  schooling  choices  but  is 
uncorrelated with ability factors (in our case inborn capabilities) is posited. Recent research in 
labor economics (for a survey see Card, 1998) on schooling usually employs the institutional 
features of the schooling system as a source of credible information for disentangling the 
causal  effects  of  schooling.  The  institutional  sources  of  variation  in  schooling  may  be 
attributable to tuition costs or geographic proximity of schools. 
Long distance to school and school fees are widely regarded as major obstacles to higher 
school attendance in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2002) and many studies (e.g. Duflo, 
2001) have demonstrated an increase in education after an increase in school availability. 
UCDT runs its development programs in ten village areas where subsistence farming is a 
major economic activity.
7 Three social workers – instructors for the purposes of this survey – 
are responsible for each village area, because the village areas are of similar geographical size 
and similar population density. Therefore, we were able to approximate the distance to school 
by the number of primary and secondary schools in the respondent’s village area. The higher 
is the number of schools in the region, the lower should be the distance to school and the 
easier should be the access to education. Assuming an equal distribution of abilities (discount 
rate) across the population
8, a higher level of school proximity should lead to higher education 
levels. Indeed, we found a 1% significant positive correlation between educational attainment 
and the number of both primary and secondary schools in the given region (0.15 for primary 
schools and 0.10 for secondary schools).  
In  addition,  we  took  advantage  of  an  education  reform  implemented  by  the  Ugandan 
government in 1996 which abolished school fees for public primary schools. This reform can 
also  be  understood  as  an  exogenous  factor  that  substantially  increased  the  Ugandan 
enrollment ratio at primary schools.
9 The average age of P7 students (the last year of study at 
primary school) in our sample is 17 years
10, and in 2005 they were 26 years old. We divided 
the sample into those who were affected by the reform (less than 26 years old) and those who 
were not (more than 26 years old). To approximate the individual exposure to the reform we 
                                                            
7 The term “village” is not very appropriate for Ugandan rural areas. As people are usually subsistence farmers 
with small fields around their houses, they live all around the countryside. There are no villages in the classical 
sense, but rather inhabited areas assigned to certain “villages.” 
8 This plausible assumption implies that people born with a low discount rate would not be concentrated in 
particular villages. 
9 For more details on the effect of the Ugandan education reform on enrollment ratios see World Bank (2002). 
10 Primary school study usually takes longer than the expected seven years, as most children have to interrupt 
their studies in years when their parents are not in a position to pay their school fees.   10 
multiplied  the  dummy  variable  for  age  eligibility  by  the  share  of  public  schools  in  total 
primary schools in the respondent’s region. The correlation between this instrumental variable 
and years of completed education was positive (0.12) and significant at the 1% level, which 
indicates  that  increased  exposure  to  the  reform  indeed  increased  years  of  completed 
education. 
As institutional factors like the number of schools and education reform exposure stand a 
reasonable  chance  of  satisfying  the  strict  exogeneity  assumptions  (in  our  case  not  being 
correlated  with  the  discount  rate),  we  apply  these  variables  as  instruments  for  years  of 
education in a 2SLS regression in order to address the possible ability bias in the correlation 
between the discount rate and education. 
 
Table 5: 2SLS results for discount rate 
Intercept 4.95***(1.01)
Education (years) -0.35 ** (0.17)
Age cohort 0.30***(0.10)
Sex (woman=1) 0.12 (0.21)
Family status (married/div.=1) -0.02 (0.26)
Clan linkage (strong=1) 0.24 (0.32)







Note:   Instrumented: Education (years) 
Instruments: Number of primary schools, number of secondary schools, variable 
measuring reform exposure 
 
The 2SLS regression results (see Table 5) demonstrate a negative effect of education on the 
discount rate which is significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, the instrumental variables 
estimate the effect  of education substantially above the corresponding OLS estimate. The 
results suggest that after controlling for other variables each additional year at school lowers 




The  age  of our respondents ranges from  15 to 70 years, with an average of 26.  The  life 
expectancy of the youngest cohort in the sample (15–19) is 56 years (WHO, 2002). In the 
traditional  economic  theorizing  based  on  the  permanent  income  hypothesis,  people  are 
assumed to closely reflect their current life expectancy in their inter-temporal decisions. The 
shorter is the expected time to death, the higher should be the individual time preference. On 
average we do indeed observe this pattern, as age appears to be a significant variable with a 
positive slope. Older Ugandans seem to have a higher time preference than their younger 
counterparts. 
In addition, experimental studies from developed countries have suggested that discount rates 
do not increase linearly throughout the lifetime and have found that discount rates are even   11 
inversely correlated with age within cohorts of young and middle-aged adults (Davies and 
Lea, 1995) due to the fact that people learn to be future-oriented during their youth from their 
parents and at school. In the Ugandan sample we did not find any significant relationship 
between the discount rate and age within these age groups. 
However,  the  link  between  our  pattern  and  the  pattern  observed  in  developed  countries 
becomes sharper if the sample is divided into a less educated half and a more educated half of 
respondents (more than two years at secondary school) and if we compare the means across 
the  age  groups  separately.  Between  the  ages  of  22  and  33  years  we  observe  a  negative 
correlation significant at the 1% level between age and the discount rate within the more 
educated group. This contrasts with no significant change in the discount rate within the less 
educated  group.  Chart  1  illustrates  the  difference.  The  difference  reaches  200  percentage 
points for the cohort aged between 29 and 34 years. 
 
Chart 1: Discount rate, age cohorts and education 
￿ Less educated half
￿ More educated half





























Note: Error bars show 95% confidence interval of mean 
 
The same effect can also be demonstrated after controlling for other characteristics. After 
interacting age cohorts as dummies with education in the OLS regression according to the 
specification in eq. (2) we calculated the effect of education for different age cohorts.  
 
ε β β β β β β β + + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑
= =










                        (2) 
The resulting coefficients are shown in Chart 2. 
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We suggest two explanations which may well complement each other for increasing patience 
for middle-aged cohorts. The first follows the traditional argument of Strotz (1956) and the 
evidence of Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez (1989) that learning to be future-oriented is part of 
our  upbringing  and  educational  process  and  as  an  individual  grows  this  type  of  learning 
overwrites  our  “inborn”  (high)  discount  rate.  In  developed  countries  education  up  to 
secondary  level  is  a  standard  which  most  people  uniformly  achieve.  Consequently,  we 
observe a high discount rate for children, a lower discount rate for more mature individuals 
and then an increasing discount rate due to shortening lifespan. More educated Ugandans 
follow this pattern as well. 
The second explanation relies on variations in the exogenous risk of HIV/AIDS infection. 
Lyons (1998) and Isaksen, Songstad and Spissoy (2002) document that there is a dramatic 
increase in the rate of HIV infection when young people become sexually active and that in 
sub-Saharan Africa the majority of new HIV infections occur among those aged 15–24 years. 
After this critical age, when people mostly have established families and a lower level of 
sexual activity, the probability of survival increases until people get old and the probability of 
survival starts decreasing again. As a consequence of HIV/AIDS the mortality risk in Uganda 
with respect to age is not a simple increasing function, but it can be approximated by a U-
shaped  curve.  The  shape  of  the  curves  in  Charts  1  and  2  suggests  that  more  educated 
respondents reflect the development of mortality risks in their discount rates considerably 
more than their less educated counterparts. As a result more educated people discount future 
pleasures substantially less during the period of their life when they are most economically 
active and when they make most important decisions about sending children to school, saving 
money for future needs or investing in better tools and equipment. 
One further implication is worth noting. The varying level of association between the discount 
rate and education for middle-aged cohorts (23–45) is difficult to reconcile with the causal 
direction from inborn discount to the level of education. In that case the difference in discount 
rates between the more educated half and the less educated half would remain constant for all 
age cohorts. The data suggest rather the opposite. The two explanations offered above have to 
rely on the causal effect of education towards the discount rate, which has something to do 
with either learning to be future-oriented or enhancing one’s ability to evaluate exogenous 
health risks, or both. 
 
Sex 
There is almost no evidence on how discount rates vary by gender in developing countries. 
Usually women are considered to be more patient than men (Davis and Lea, 1995; Yunus, 
2002). In the context of the poorest countries, Gugerty (2001) emphasizes that if women need   13 
to perform the daily tasks of feeding and caring for the family, they may be more concerned 
with  meeting  today’s  needs  rather  than  planning  for  tomorrow.  In  their  Vietnam  study 
Anderson et al. (2004) did not find any significant differences between men and women. In 
our study the average discount rate for Ugandan men is 376%, whereas for women it is 397% 
and the difference is not significant after controlling for other characteristics (see Tables 3 and 




Some  psychological  studies  (Mullainathan,  2005)  show  that  close  ties  within  clans  may 
discourage members from saving and having free funds and encourage them to spend money 
as soon as they can. The reason is that they might be worried about pressure from their family 
or neighbors to share their income or to help out if someone else is in a difficult financial 
situation. Similarly, people with a strong clan linkage may consider their clan embeddedness 
to be a form of insurance and feel less need to create precautionary savings. These social 
norms  may  therefore  contribute  to  higher  discount  rates  among  people  who  are  more 
embedded in the traditional structures of the clan than among those with weaker clan links. 
Some other authors (Harrison, 2000, and Etounga-Manguelle, 2000) continue in the Weberian 
tradition that exalts protestant ethics and emphasize that African traditional tribal societies 
focus on the past and present and not on the future, in contrast to other cultures. African 
author Etounga-Manguelle (2000: 69) writes that a typical African is deeply rooted in the 
culture of his ancestors and considers his ways as being a result of an omnipresent higher will 
and is thus very weakly interested what the future will bring. Even though the reasoning is 
very different to the preceding approach the outcome should be the same: the higher the clan 
influence, the higher the discount rate. 
We found a positive difference of 70 percentage points between the respondents who stated 
that their decision-making process is strongly influenced by clan and those with a weaker clan 
linkage. The difference is stable for all age cohorts. Again, clan loyalty seems to be closely 
associated with level of education. Clans are predominantly masculine structures and our data 
provide rare empirical evidence on how notable is the decrease in the proportion of men with 
a  strong  clan  linkage  as  they  attend  primary  school.  This  proportion  decreased  by  40 
percentage points (see Chart 3). The question remains whether it is education which makes 
traditional social norms less attractive in the eyes of the respondents, or whether people with a 
stronger clan linkage are less inclined to go to school and prefer to rely on their clan. 
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Chart 3: Proportion of people with strong clan linkage and education levels 
￿ Men
￿ Women



































































After controlling for other variables the positive relationship between clan loyalty and the 
discount  rate is significant at around the 10% level, depending  on the type of regression 
employed.  The  results  suggest  that  traditional  social  norms  may  play  a  role  in  Ugandan 
patience  formation;  however,  questions  about  the  exact  mechanism  and  direction  of  the 
causality remain to be explored. 
 
Income 
There are a  number  of studies  linking the discount rate to wealth in both  developed and 
developing countries. Richer people are considered to be more patient, as they not pressed by 
basic  needs. Hausman  (1979) and  Lawrence (1991) found discount rates to be negatively 
correlated with wealth in the United States. The studies from developing countries mentioned 
above yielded more mixed results. On the one hand Pender (1996) found a negative relation 
between income and the discount rate in Indian villages, but on the other hand Vietnamese 
data in Anderson et. al (2002) did not show any link between these two variables.  
The correlation between the discount rate and income groups in the Ugandan sample does not 
reveal  a  significant  relationship.  The  regression  coefficient  for  income  is  positive  but 
insignificant  in  the  OLS,  PROBIT  and  TOBIT  regressions.  In  the  2SLS  regression  (see 
Table 5) income emerged as positive and even significant at the 5% level. Besides saying that 
the results are difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that poorer people in sub-Saharan 
Africa  have  to  behave  more  impatiently  than  richer  people,  we  do  not  feel  confident  to 
conclude anything more. The results might be influenced by the fact that the vast majority of 
respondents have an income of less than USD 1/day, making them poor by most standards, 
and  there  may  be  too  little  income  variation  within  the  sample  to  obtain  clearer  results. 
Alternatively, profession may have not been an adequate measure for defining income groups. 
Nevertheless, all other measures of income in the context of subsistence farming are largely 
disputed within the experimental literature as well. 
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4  Conclusions 
 
The paper aimed to contribute to the understanding of why there is lack of domestic saving 
and investment in rural parts  of sub-Saharan  Africa. It  focuses on heterogeneity in  inter-
temporal preferences as a possible explanation of this important puzzle and scrutinizes how 
individual patience – measured by the discount rate – is formed. The study is based on a 
unique experimental data set collected from 856 respondents in Ugandan villages, which is to 
large extent representative of the literate population in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa in 
terms of education, health conditions, social norms and structure of economic activities. 
We found an extremely high average discount rate amounting to 385% annually. Even though 
there might be some upward and downward biases due to the sign and size effects of the 
amount  in  question,  based  on  the  existing  evidence  Ugandan  respondents  seem  to  be 
substantially less patient than their counterparts in developed countries and Asia.  
Importantly,  regressions  unveiled  a  robust  association  between  education  and  individual 
patience  after  controlling  for  other  variables  (age,  sex,  income,  marital  status  and  clan 
linkage). In addition, to address the possible endogeneity between education and the discount 
rate  we  instrumented  the  level  of  education  by  the  exogenous  number  of  schools  in  the 
respondent’s village area and exposure to the Ugandan education reform in 1996 (abolishing 
school fees for public primary schools). Estimates suggested a significant causal effect of 
education on the discount rate and showed that an additional year of education lowers the 
individual discount rate on average by 35 percentage points. We did not detect any significant 
differences between the discount rates of men and women. Interestingly, the estimates did not 
show a negative correlation between income and the discount rate as is often suggested. The 
traditional social norms within large groups of families (clans) seem to matter for the discount 
rate,  as  respondents  with  a  stronger  clan  linkage  were  on  average  more  impatient  than 
respondents with weaker clan loyalty. 
We  hope  that  this  study  provides  a  further  stimulus  for  studying  behavioral  issues  and 
psychological  factors  as  part  of  the  efforts  to  understand  the  behavior  of  people  in  sub-
Saharan Africa, and that it contributes to a realization that the growth prospects of the region 
may be hindered by more than just income and institutional constraints. The results presented 
above  are  consistent  with  patience  understood as  an ability  which  needs  to  be  taught  by 
parents, learnt at school or promoted by social norms. The estimates showed a remarkable 
capacity of additional years of education to deliver the abilities necessary for more forward-
looking behavior among Ugandan respondents.  
The  high  correlation  between  education  and  subsequent  growth  (one  year  of  additional 
schooling attainment is associated with 0.30 percent faster annual growth over the period 
1960–1990) observed in cross-sectional data is well documented
11. As argued in Banerjee and 
Duflo (2004) and Bils and Klenow (2000) this correlation is too high to be explained by the 
standard causal effect of education on individual productivity. Similarly, World Bank (2006) 
acknowledges that “education impact on economic growth is well-established; precisely how 
this happens is less well-understood.” The discount rate plays a fundamental role in saving, 
investment and willingness to cooperate, which are all necessary ingredients for economic 
development. Although a number of questions remain open, the Ugandan findings may start 
teasing the minds of researchers and policy-makers with the proposition that there might be a 
new way in which education influences development in sub-Saharan Africa – by shaping 
individual patience. 
                                                            
11 See, for example, Barro (1991), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)   16 
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Appendix 
Imagine that someone trustworthy comes with 200,000 Ugandan shillings for you for free. 
But he promises to give you more than that in 1 year’s time if you don’t take the 200,000 
shillings right now. 
Fumitirizamu  singa  omuntu  akuletera  emitwalo  amakumi  abiri  ag’ensimbi  za  Uganda  Kubwerere.  Naye 
n’akusubiza okukuwa ezisingawo oluvanyuma Lw’omwaka gumu singa obeera tozitwaliddewo mu kiseera ekyo. 
      What would you prefer? (select only one answer) 
      Kiki ky’osinga okwagala? (Londako ekituufu kimu kyokka) 
￿ 200,000 Ugandan shillings right now.  
200,000 ensimbi za Uganda kati kati. 
￿ 250,000 Ugandan shillings 1 year later. 
250,000 ensimbi za Uganda oluvanyuma lw’omwaka gumu. 
What would you prefer? (select only one answer) 
      Kiki ky’osinga okwagala? (Londako ekituufu kimu kyokka) 
￿ 200,000 Ugandan shillings right now. 
200,000 ensimbi za Uganda kati kati. 
￿ 500,000 Ugandan shillings 1 year later. 
500,000 ensimbi za Uganda oluvanyuma lw’omwaka gumu. 
What would you prefer? (select only one answer) 
      Kiki ky’osinga okwagala? (Londako ekituufu kimu kyokka) 
￿ 200,000 Ugandan shillings right now. 
200,000 ensimbi za Uganda kati kati. 
￿ 800,000 Ugandan shillings 1 year later. 
800,000 ensimbi za Uganda oluvanyuma lw’omwaka gumu. 
What would you prefer? (select only one answer) 
      Kiki ky’osinga okwagala? (Londako ekituufu kimu kyokka) 
￿ 200,000 Ugandan shillings right now.  
200,000 ensimbi za Uganda kati kati. 
￿ 1,200,000 Ugandan shillings 1 year later. 
1,200,000 ensimbi za Uganda oluvanyuma lw’omwaka gumu. 
What would you prefer? (select only one answer) 
      Kiki ky’osinga okwagala? (Londako ekituufu kimu kyokka) 
￿ 200,000 Ugandan shillings right now. 
200,000 ensimbi za Uganda kati kati. 
￿ 1,500,000 Ugandan shillings 1 year later. 
1,500,000 ensimbi za Uganda oluvanyuma lw’omwaka gumu.  
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